

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

OS REGISTRY
FILE ~~SECOM~~

SECOM-D-245
24 September 1985

CMC-7-3-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members
Chairman, SECOM Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee

FROM:


Chairman


SUBJECT: Update of SECOM Harassments and Provocations Study

Attached for review is a draft update of the 1982 SECOM harassments and provocations study. Thanks are due the CIA, NSA and Navy members for contributing updated material needed to round out the first draft of this study done in mid-1984. Addressees are requested to review the attached draft and to provide their concurrences or comments to the SECOM staff not later than 11 October 1985. If practicable, members will be asked to concur in a final version at the 16 October SECOM meeting (the last regular meeting scheduled for 1985).

STAT

Attachment:
As Stated

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OS REGISTRY
 9/24

INTRODUCTION

This study describes harassments and provocations against Americans assigned to or traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba and China. The cases cited illustrate methods used by Communist country intelligence and security services and are intended to augment official defensive security briefings for persons authorized access to classified information who may travel to those areas. The 24 June 1982 DCI Security Committee publication on this subject should be reviewed for supplementary information. Items in this version are based on reports by US Government departments and agencies on incidents occurring in the 1982-85 period.

For purposes of this study:

HARASSMENT means any action taken against a person or group to prevent, inhibit, or delay the achievement of personal or group objectives (e.g., impeding collection of information by assigned diplomats).

PROVOCATION means any action taken against a person or group to induce self-damaging action (e.g., attempts to involve Americans in illegal activities).

Attempts by hostile services to recruit Americans to commit espionage are outside the purview of this study.

A limited amount of information also is provided on steps travelers can take or avoid which may help decrease unwelcome consequences if subject to hijacking or terrorist attack.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SOVIET UNION

1. Soviet authorities endeavor to keep fairly close tabs on foreigners visiting the USSR. This is done largely by keeping them in well defined tracks through organized tour itineraries and other administrative arrangements designed to discourage the visitor from deviating very far from the prescribed program. The ordinary tourist is rarely subjected to individual physical surveillance or other form of specific security attention unless he or she does something which the authorities regard as suspicious or offensive. It is important to realize, however, that the KGB evidently believes that foreign spies abound among tourist groups and some acts, which would be regarded as of no consequence in Western countries, may be interpreted with suspicion by Soviet authorities and cause special attention to be focused on the individual by the KGB. Types of things which have caused problems for foreign visitors in the past include:

a. Bringing in literature of a political nature which is anti-Soviet in tone or which is forbidden in the USSR. Travelers should leave such material at home, but above all should not try to give it to Soviet citizens. In addition to political literature, the Soviets object to western pornography, in which they include such publications as Playboy. There is lively interest in both types of literature on the part of many Soviet citizens, but a tourist who carries such material in any quantity or seems interested in distributing it to Soviet citizens may find himself the object of unpleasant attention from the security authorities, as, most certainly, will the Soviet citizens to whom he gives it.

b. Black market currency exchange and other illegal financial transactions. Tourists are frequently approached by Soviets on the streets offering to exchange rubles for dollars at a very favorable rate and with offers to buy clothing and other western items. There is a flourishing black market in such items in the Soviet Union, particularly in those areas frequented by foreign tourists. Although approaches by Soviet citizens along those lines are not normally KGB provocations, the KGB does keep close watch on black marketeers; such transactions are illegal both for the buyer and the seller. Travelers should reject overtures of this nature. Another popular type of illegal transaction is the sale of icons to foreigners in other than state stores. The purchase of icons from individuals is illegal--many are not genuine and all are subject to confiscation if found in the possession of a traveler on leaving the USSR.

c. Photography. The Soviets have rather strict ideas of what they consider to be military or security installations. Tourists will be advised in general terms of what they may photograph and what they may not, but it is always wise when in doubt to check with the "Inturist" guide before taking pictures. Although not mentioned in official instructions, Soviets are also very sensitive to people taking photographs of scenes which put the USSR in a bad light--run-down housing areas, lines at stores, drunks, or shabbily dressed people on the street, etc. Tourists taking such pictures have occasionally been the target of harassment by "patriotic" citizens or auxiliary militia.

d. Personal contacts with political dissidents, Jewish activists, and other elements considered undesirable by the authorities. Such contacts should be avoided. Visitors who go out of their way to meet with such people

have frequently been subjected to lengthy customs searches and other forms of harassment upon leaving the Soviet Union. The Soviets have expelled visitors from the USSR for such meetings.

e. Narcotics. The Soviets are extremely hard on foreigners found with narcotics in their possession. Some have received lengthy prison terms. Under no circumstances should a foreign visitor bring any form of narcotic into the Soviet Union. Visitors who are using prescription drugs should carry them in containers bearing recognizable pharmacists' labels.

2. Foreign visitors should be aware that, although the KGB does not normally subject tourists to provocations or other forms of harassment, there are certain categories of individuals whom the KGB routinely singles out for special scrutiny:

a. Persons who speak Russian, have Russian-sounding names, have relatives in the USSR, or have traveled repeatedly to the USSR in the past;

b. Persons who work or have worked for the US Government or its contractors, particularly in positions involving foreign affairs, national security, or military matters, or are close relations to such persons;

c. Persons who have had extensive contact with Soviet officials in the past;

d. Persons known publicly to have expressed strong views against the Soviet government, or vigorous opposition to US policy on matters bearing on the USSR;

e. Persons who, during their visit to the Soviet Union, make special efforts to establish personal contact with Soviet citizens.

3. Individuals meeting any of the above criteria should be especially circumspect in their behavior. Although there is little for them to fear if

they use good judgment, visitors may be subjected to KGB approaches of one sort or another designed to test their reactions, determine their susceptibility to compromise or inducement to cooperate with the KGB, or intimidate them and others from attempting actions of concern to the KGB.

STAT

4. The following are some general "do's and don'ts" for visitors in the Soviet Union which, in particular, should be observed by persons falling into the categories mentioned in paragraph 2:

a. "Don'ts":



(2) Do not respond to sexual overtures from anyone. There are prostitutes in virtually all tourist hotels in the USSR as well as males seeking out feminine companionship among foreign visitors. This activity is closely monitored by the KGB and virtually all of the individuals involved are subject to KGB pressure.

(3) Do not overindulge in alcohol.

(4) Do not engage in black market currency exchanges or other illegal transactions described earlier. The financial advantage of buying rubles on the black market might appear substantial, but it is definitely not worth the risk.

(5) Do not attempt to propagandize or engage in political arguments. Many Soviets are intensely curious about the US and are

genuinely interested in talking with Americans. Their questions are best answered in an objective, forthright manner without drawing unfavorable comparisons with the USSR.

(6) Do not accept packages or letters from Soviet citizens for mailing or delivery outside the Soviet Union. Some such requests are genuine, but many are not. In many instances the contents can be compromising to the person carrying them, to the Soviet who gave them to him, or both.

b. "Do's":

(1) Do behave in a natural manner and enjoy your trip.

(2) Do stay with your group or, at least, with some members thereof.

STAT

(3) Do remember that Soviet citizens in general are discouraged from extensive contact with foreigners and that those Soviets who engage in such contacts without authorization can expect to be questioned by the KGB. Maintain a healthy skepticism toward persons who seem to attach themselves to you. If invited to a Soviet home or to any other form of private get-together, try to ensure that at least one other member of your group is with you.

STAT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

SOVIET UNION

The Soviets continue attempted provocations against Americans in the USSR, apparently in attempts to entrap them in activities that can be treated as crimes against Soviet law or publicized to support claims that Americans are corrupt or immoral.

Case 1 During a two-year tour in the Soviet Union, an American officer and his traveling companion - either a male associate or his wife - were routinely the subjects of attempts by Soviet nationals to engage them in questionable social relationships involving alcohol or loose women. When the Americans went to hotel restaurants, Soviet citizens would always be seated at their tables even if other tables were unoccupied. Depending on the composition of the American party, there were usually two Soviets consisting of either two men, a man and a woman, or two women. The officer avoided trouble by declining the Soviet offers to "socialize" and by limiting himself to polite conversation.

Case 2 In early 1983, an aircrewman making an official trip to Moscow went to his assigned hotel. As he entered, one of two attractive women wearing European-style clothes started throwing him kisses. His room phone rang soon thereafter and a woman asked, in excellent English, "is Bill there?" He said "no." The caller then asked if she and her friend could come up for a drink and spend the night. He replied in the negative and hung up. About an hour later the woman called again, waking the crewman, and asking the same thing. The crewman asked if she was one of the women he had seen earlier in the hotel lobby. She said she was, and stated that she and her friend were coming up. The crewman went back to sleep and had no further contact with the "friendly" women.

STAT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

[REDACTED]

Harassments including physical and verbal abuse, are used by the Soviets in attempts to demoralize and intimidate Americans who are perceived as too independent of official societal discipline or as impediments to Soviet efforts to control rigidly US official presence in the USSR.

Case 7 Soviet citizens, especially working class persons, are a volatile and unpredictable element for travelers, especially after having been indoctrinated on the need to protect their workplace and homeland against the "foreign threat." In late 1982, two US officers touring the Soviet Union were forcibly restrained by a group claiming to be workers at a local factory. The workers searched one officer's pockets and shoulder travel bag, and forcibly seized the officer's camera. The other officer was physically restrained and separated from his traveling companion. Both were physically assaulted for about a minute. By this time, about 20 to 30 persons surrounded the officers and threatened them with further physical abuse. The officers declared themselves as US officials at the outset and presented diplomatic credentials. The "worker" who wrote up the report on the incident was recognized as one of the surveillants who followed the officers during the day.

Leningrad is a hostile environment for Americans, especially for those with official status. Unprovoked assaults against US personnel are blunt warnings to our officers and signals to Soviet citizens to avoid contact with Americans.

Case 8 In the spring of 1984, a US officer was assaulted in Leningrad by three Soviets as he left a restaurant. Soviet militiamen there made no effort to stop the attack. A month later, the official newspaper in Leningrad praised local citizens for apprehending US officials who were allegedly "spying." The article was reprinted in another Soviet paper, and seemed designed to encourage private abuse against American officials.

In August 1984, the US Department of State issued a travel advisory warning US citizens of the potential danger of arrest and denial of access to US consular officials if they visit Leningrad. This advisory was based on a significant number of cases of "flagrant harassment" of Americans during the preceding six months. The advisory followed the beating by Soviets of a Marine guard assigned to the US Consulate General in Leningrad. Seizing him on the street at night near the consulate, two Soviet militiamen held the Marine's arms while three Soviet plainclothes men beat him and kicked him. The Marine was taken to a nearby Soviet jail where his assailants jeered at him. When released the next morning, Soviet authorities claimed that the Marine had been drunk and disorderly. At about the same period, an American exchange professor in the USSR visited Leningrad and made an appointment to meet a well-known specialist in 18th century Russian literature. Upon entering the apartment building, he was seized by three plainclothes men who took his passport and visa, shoved him into a paddy wagon and took him to a police station. The American's request to call the US consulate was not honored, and he was only released after signing a statement "apologizing for the inconvenience he had caused local authorities."

Case 9 Three harassment actions in December 1984 illustrate the continuing nature of Soviet behavior toward Americans in Leningrad. An American diplomat was grabbed by a Soviet plainclothes man and forcibly evicted from a courthouse. An American attache and his wife were forcibly detained by Soviets who were later described by a Soviet official as "simply concerned workers whose suspicion was no doubt raised by the (Americans') proximity to objects of military significance." Two American citizens were detained by Leningrad police for three hours after they tried to visit a "refusenik" in the city. Their request to call the American consulate was initially refused, but later granted. When released, they were ordered to leave the USSR the next day.

Case 10 A March 1985 incident in Moscow shows that Leningrad is not the only place where Americans can expect to be victims of unprovoked assaults. A Marine guard was leaving a Moscow hotel bar when two Soviets in plainclothes accosted him, ignored his protests that he didn't want to talk and planned only to return to the Embassy, and dragged him into an adjacent room and beat him. Breaking free, the Marine was able to get away when a friendly foreign diplomat appeared on the scene. Soviet officials later claimed that the Marine had assaulted an elderly hotel attendant and had to be overpowered and taken into custody.

Taking photographs in the Soviet Union of anything other than officially approved subjects may well result in unpleasant consequences.

Case 11 In early 1982, a US serviceman assigned in Moscow was visiting an open air market where Soviet farmers are permitted to sell ten percent of what

they grow. He was photographing the colorful scene when a Soviet woman approached him and asked that he stop, as his photographs could "jeopardize their situation." (The private market is tolerated to varying degrees as a means of providing a more adequate diet, but is subject to restriction because it is inconsistent with Communist dogma.) The serviceman and his family then began walking back to their car when a Soviet male approached and ordered the American to follow him. The American told his family to return to their vehicle, and determined through questions that the Soviet male was a KGB agent. On the pretext of walking to a local militia station to resolve the matter, the American succeeded in running to his vehicle, locked the doors and drove away. While he suffered no repercussions from this incident, the KGB could easily have used it as an excuse for making things unpleasant.

In a similar vein, offering a militiaman money to overlook a traffic offense is likely (as it would be in the United States) to bring painful consequences, then or later.

Case 12 During the spring of 1984, a US officer sightseeing in Moscow was asked by a Soviet to sell his radio. The officer refused. He also refused a latter offer to buy an icon. Still later the officer was stopped by a militiaman for taking photographs. The militiaman asked for the camera and film, but left when the officer pretended not to understand. The same day the officer was stopped by another militiaman for making an illegal left turn. The militiaman asked to see the officer's papers and pointed to him saying "you," while making picture-taking motions. The officer gave the militiaman a

three ruble note and was allowed to leave. The officer did not stop to consider that his monetary payment could open him to a criminal charge of bribery - during that visit or a later one.

As part of an officially atheist regime, Soviet officials are frequently hostile to activity they perceive as tending to propagate Christianity.

Case 13 In May 1985, an American citizen visiting Moscow with her tour group was detained overnight and required to leave the USSR the next day when Soviet customs officials searching her luggage found booklets containing the text of the Sermon on the Mount printed in English and Russian. She was accused of attempting to smuggle banned literature into the USSR. The booklets were confiscated.

Case 14 In the fall of 1984, the Soviet news service Tass accused the American who had served as Roman Catholic Chaplain to the foreign community in Moscow of conspiring with a native Christian to build up an illegal congregation of Soviet believers. (The American left the USSR in the summer of 1983. The Soviet Christian, who Tass claimed was involved with the American, was arrested that year and charged under the Russian criminal code with "preparing children for confirmation.")

A close family relationship with a US government official can prompt extra attention by Soviet authorities to visitors to the USSR.

Case 15 The teen-age son of a US government official visited the USSR with a student tour group. Upon arrival at the airport the other students were processed quickly but this young man was directed to an adjacent room for

search of his belongings. While that was being done, he was questioned about his father's occupation. Later in the tour, he was approached by a "reporter" asking questions about the placement of military equipment in Europe. The interview was quickly ended when the young man's responses did not appear to meet with the "reporter's" approval.

Don't sign Russian language documents you don't understand, or which contain false statements about you. If pressed to do so, ask firmly and consistently to see the nearest US Consul.

Case 16 During mid-1984, a US officer on temporary assignment to Moscow left his luggage at the international hotel upon arrival. When he returned, he found it had been opened. He was later approached by a "hotel official" who asked him to sign a form in Russian. The official said the form had to be signed because the previous room occupant stole the linens upon departure. The US officer refused to sign.

EASTERN EUROPE

In most East European countries, the security services responsible for monitoring and working against foreigners inside their borders are patterned after the KGB. Similarly, the techniques, methods and approaches they use generally follow KGB practice. Such differences as there are reflect individual country circumstances, such as the Polish government's concern about Solidarity and relations with the Catholic Church. Immigration patterns have resulted in many US citizens having relatives in East European countries. Americans visiting those countries have been approached with offers to help relatives obtain exit visas or with threats to the relatives depending on the Americans' responses to what is demanded of them. While the passage of time apparently has made the "hostage" approach infrequent, the following cases illustrate a variety of provocation and harassment methods.

As in the USSR, some entrapment attempts are obvious.

Case 1 Two American officers traveling in Poland stopped for food in a hotel. Soon after being seated, two Polish men in their late 20s sat down with them, displayed large amounts of money, bought drinks, talked freely about Soviet missiles and offered sexual enticements. The Americans thanked the Poles for their hospitality, ignored their attempt to engage them in conversation on military subjects and their offer to find out "what a Polish woman is like," and left the restaurant.

Consistent refusal of unsolicited overtures will help visitors avoid entrapments and provocations.

STAT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0



American presence at demonstrations lacking government sanction can result in harassment.

Case 8 In May 1985, two American diplomats were observing a mass and May Day demonstration at a Polish church. The diplomats kept a discreet distance away and fully followed diplomatic conventions. They were soon approached by Polish police and asked for their identification which, when produced, was confiscated. The policemen ordered them into an unmarked vehicle. When one of the diplomats protested, he was pushed, struck, kicked and forced into the vehicle. He and his colleague were taken to the police station. En route, the policemen who seized their documents denied that the Americans were diplomats and said they would be accused of throwing stones at police vehicles. The diplomats were released after about 20 minutes at the police station. They were later charged by the Polish government with participating in an anti-government demonstration and ordered to leave the country.

Rigorous and petty enforcement of local rules can be an unpleasant experience for visitors used to the flexibility of western society.

Case 9 Travelers staying in private homes in an East European country must within 24 hours report to a government office with the "house book" for signature. This book is charged to a specified individual in the neighborhood. A recent visitor was unable to locate the custodian of the book, and decided to wait to comply with the rule until the local individual returned. After 24 hours had passed, the visitor was picked up by the militia, taken to the local station, and fined approximately \$100 for his infraction.

CUBA

Assignment to or travel to Cuba can result in unpleasant experiences.

Case 1 A Marine guard assigned to the US Interests Section was in a restaurant at a popular beach when a Cuban began to insult him. The Marine extricated himself from a shoving match and left the building. On the street outside, a vehicle drove up and several local "militia" knocked the Marine down and injected him with an unknown substance which made him lose consciousness. American officials were later called by Cuban authorities. When they arrived and protested what had happened, the Cubans claimed the injection was necessary to control the Marine's violent behavior.

Case 2 Two dual nationality American servicemen traveled to Havana to visit relatives. While in Cuba, persons claiming to be from the "Immigration Department" took the passports from one of the servicemen and directed him to what appeared to be a private house. There he found the other American being detained. The next day six Cubans arrived bearing a letter claiming that one of the servicemen and another person had come to Cuba to "harm the revolution." Their detention was explained as necessary while an investigation of the letter's claims was conducted. Both servicemen were released after 18 hours' detention. They were not questioned about their military duties, and were fed and allowed to make personal phone calls.

CHINA

The Chinese security service, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), appears to take a hard-line approach to dealing with unofficial contacts between Chinese nationals and foreigners. Chinese who establish actual or presumed close ties with foreigners are liable to seizure and punishment. While diplomats and official visitors are likely to have their status respected, private foreigners studying or working in China may encounter unpleasant experiences.

STAT

Case 1 The wife of a European diplomat was having lunch with a local artist in one of Beijing's biggest hotels when PSB officers approached the table, seized the artist and dragged him to a waiting car. The diplomat's wife attempted to intercede and was shoved aside.

Case 2 A western European diplomat was driving to the International Club with a Chinese girl for lunch in 1983 when a PSB vehicle forced them to the curb. PSB officers opened the door of the diplomat's car, dragged the girl out, forced her into their vehicle and drove off.

Case 3 In 1984, an American journalist was spending the night in Beijing's best hotel with a Canadian girl of Chinese extraction when PSB officers broke through their door and attempted to drag the girl out. In the confusion the girl was able to produce identification proving her Canadian citizenship, whereupon she was released.

Case 4 A foreign student was meeting his Chinese girlfriend in a park in 1984 when PSB officers approached, forced her into a waiting vehicle and drove away. She was released several days later.

Not all student-local relationships turn out that easily.

Case 5 Another foreign student was arrested and held illegally for several days in 1983, ostensibly for fraternizing with local men. She was also accused of espionage, denied access to consular officials for about two days, and eventually released after she signed a "confession." Her boyfriend was detained for almost two years before being released.

Journalists are viewed with suspicion in many Communist countries. Their normal (to us) information gathering activities can be viewed as bordering on espionage, as the following case illustrates.

Case 6 PSB officers broke into the apartment of a western European journalist in 1983, beat him and ransacked his room looking for evidence of "espionage." Failing to find any, they arrested him for "smuggling" and held him several days before expelling him from China.

Reporting a theft to local authorities may result in being asked some tricky questions.

Case 7 An American official in China discovered valuable belongings missing from his hotel residence. After reporting this he was interviewed by the security service. A security official asked the American to list his local contacts as possible sources for the theft. The American politely evaded this attempt to identify his sources by responding that the hotel staff were the only logical suspects. The interview was then closed.

As is the case in the Soviet Union, photographing military items in China will result in unpleasantness.

Case 8 During a 1984 tour, an American military officer photographed Chinese military equipment at two locations. During internal travel from Beijing to Xian, the officer's locked suitcase was deliberately damaged. The message for him was clear.

STAT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0